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Beyond Financialisation? Transformative Strategies for 
More Sustainable Financial Markets in the European 
Union 
Dieter Pesendorfer* 
Abstract 
The global financial crisis has led many regulators and lawmakers to a rethinking about 
current versus optimum financial market structures and activities that include a variety and 
even radical ideas about deleveraging and downsizing finance. This paper focuses on the 
flaws and shortcomings of regulatory reforms of finance and on the necessity of and scope 
for more radical transformative strategies. With ‘crisis economics’ back, the most developed 
countries, including the EU member states, are still on the edge to disaster and confronted 
with systemic risk. Changes in financial regulation adopted in the aftermath of the financial 
meltdown have not been radical enough to transform the overall system of finance-driven 
capitalism towards a more sustainable system with a more embedded finance. The paper 
discusses financialisation as a concept to understand the development trends in finance over 
the past decades and various theories to describe the typical trends and patterns in financial 
regulation. By focusing on a limited number of regulatory reforms in the European Union, the 
limitations of current reforms and the need for additional transformative strategies necessary 
to overcome the finance-driven accumulation regime are explored. Finally, the regulatory 
space for such transformative strategies and for taming finance in times of crisis, austerity, 
and increased public protest potential is analysed. 
Keywords: financialisation, financial market integration, financial reform, financial 
innovation, financial crisis. 
A. Introduction 
Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007, conventional wisdom about modern 
financial markets changed dramatically. The various stages of the crises, aftershocks, and the 
                                                
* Queen’s University Belfast, School of Law, d.pesendorfer@qub.ac.uk. 
return of ‘crisis economics’1 revealed multiple market, state and regulatory failures and how 
problematic the overall role of finance as well as particular structures, activities, and products 
has become. As the crisis started in the centre of global finance and quickly threatened very 
large financial institutions that were regarded by their regulators as top performers in risk 
management and as systemically relevant or too-big-to-fail (TBTF), bold and swift 
emergency action followed by a fundamental overhaul of the regulatory regimes seemed the 
only acceptable response. This led in the USA to the most significant financial reform since 
the 1930s with the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 that promises in its subtitle among other things to increase financial stability by 
improving accountability and transparency, to end TBTF, and to protect taxpayers from 
paying for bailouts. With the same intentions, in the European Union (EU) a number of 
existing regulations and directives were modified, and entirely new ones have been adopted 
with additional proposals in the decision-making process. In the overall context of a systemic 
crisis, questions about necessary lessons for states and markets as well as whether a smarter 
and better regulatory regime could ever help to avoid major crises or to make at least a 
significant difference have become parts of a highly contentious discourse about the future of 
finance, capitalism, globalisation, regional integration, and regulation. For the EU, these 
questions are moreover linked to lessons from financial integration before the crisis since 
excesses and significant resource misallocations as well as regulatory shortcomings related to 
the pre-crisis integration regime have become clearly visible. Regulators and lawmakers 
focused on rapidly cleaning up and recapitalising banks and on law reforms. Additionally, 
debates emerged about the optimum design for regulating finance and the optimum financial 
market structures that include even radical proposals for downsizing and deleveraging 
finance that would lead to a fundamentally different balance between finance and society. 
The reforms in the USA, EU, and other jurisdictions have been designed to contribute to a 
more sustainable, more resilient, more preventive, and more precautionary regime, and 
regulators have begun trying to ‘tame finance’ after decades of excesses. For the EU, where 
the crisis exposed numerous fault lines and recapitalising banks and cleaning up their balance 
sheets has been more complex and slower than in the USA, the debate also includes questions 
about short- to long-term effects on (less or more) economic and financial integration that 
have with the currency union crisis escalating quickly culminated in proposals for deeper 
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integration of at least the Eurozone countries by establishing a banking union. While the 
latter will ultimately require a lengthy process to change the Treaty, key EU actors claimed 
that the EU would not only push for stricter regulation for financial markets at the G20 level 
but also take over a pioneer role in adopting such regulation in line with G20 commitments 
while keeping the goal of an ever more integrated financial market and avoiding further 
market fragmentation that had resulted from the crisis. The Obama Administration also 
claimed a pioneer role in driving regulatory change. Both jurisdictions are major economic 
powers whose regulations can have extra-territorial policy impacts. However, both 
jurisdictions have remained careful about any issues that could arise from regulatory 
competition between them or with other existing or emerging financial centres, and in key 
areas convergence emerged via transatlantic dialogue and regulatory cooperation between 
competent authorities. 
Despite major regulatory reforms, it remains unclear in this period of high uncertainty 
what the consequences with regard to transforming the existing financial system will be, if 
the reforms already adopted are only cosmetic or go into the right direction without creating 
bad unintended consequences, and what sort of regulatory reform could tame finance within 
an overall framework that is more preventive and precautionary. Besides concerns about 
negative impacts on recovery, there are moreover worries because the most developed 
countries, including the EU member states, are still on the edge to disaster and confronted 
with systemic risk that could only too easily result in significant aftershocks or a new (phase 
of the) crisis. As the crisis transformed the states’ capacities fundamentally, it may have led 
to the ‘depleted state’ which lacks legitimacy as well as organisational and financial 
resources and is therefore no longer able to achieve the necessary outputs or outcomes.2 In 
short, when the next crisis hits too early, warnings that financial institutions are now not only 
TBTF but also ‘too big to save’3 might become reality. Getting the system right is therefore 
of utter importance. To address at least some of the uncertainties, lawmakers on both sides of 
the Atlantic left major decisions to regulators who have to adopt detailed rules and 
implementation standards or were put in charge to study certain areas in more detail as a basis 
for any further reforms. This might lead to various problems, given traditionally strong 
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business influence on regulators, but might also result in gradual changes that help 
overcoming any shortcomings, flaws, and loopholes from recent reforms. 
This paper focuses on the question whether the pre-crisis system understood as 
financialisation will prevail or can be transformed beyond its problematic characteristics. 
Firstly, it will discuss in part B the concept of financialisation, how this accumulation regime 
led to financial instability and a particular mode of regulation, and a number of theories 
explaining regulatory change. The main part C will first describe the general features and 
trends in the European version of financialisation, before looking at a limited number of key 
reforms that will affect this accumulation regime. It will be argued that regulatory changes 
adopted in the aftermath of the financial meltdown in the EU have not been radical enough to 
transform the overall system of finance-driven capitalism towards a more sustainable system 
with a more embedded finance and that new transformative strategies are necessary to 
achieve system transformation. Although quite significant reformulations within 
financialisation are observable, reforms resulted in a number of loopholes, flaws, and 
possible unintended consequences that altogether do not put into question the overall 
dominance of finance and have created continued financial instability. As the European 
reform debates are embedded in global debates and as they are especially reflecting any 
intended or unintended consequences for the future of the European financial sector in global 
competition, especially with Wall Street, G20 commitments and US reform debates are taken 
into account. Part D concludes and discusses how a more embedded and more sustainable 
financial sector could be created via gradual institutional reforms and new transformative 
strategies. 
B. Financialisation, Crises, Regulation, and the Future of Finance 
Contrary to pre-crisis mainstream claims that modern finance with its highly sophisticated 
risk management practices would have made the financial system safer, the evidence is clear 
that the liberalisation and deregulation of global financial markets since the 1970s did not 
result in stability but in an overall system that has frequently generated all sorts of financial 
crises and moreover that systemic crises have become ever more severe and costly.4 
Accelerated by financial innovation that was designed to maximise profits by exploiting 
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regulatory loopholes and flaws and often also unfair market advantages, financial markets 
underwent significant transformations that led to an extremely leveraged system with overly 
complex and opaque structures, activities, and products. Ignoring numerous warnings by 
critics about these developments, the mainstream actors had shared a dominant paradigm 
based on the belief that liberalised and deregulated financial markets would be efficient and 
that finance as new main organising principle would be beneficial for the entire society, all 
social groups, and every individual who could participate in better, widely accessible, and 
therefore more democratic, new financial products. Critics on the other hand had portrayed 
deregulation as dangerous and the dominance of finance negatively by describing the system 
as a casino and a zero-sum game based on purely negative forms of speculation in which the 
financial sector extracts resources from other sectors and moreover undermines democracy 
by markets outgrowing states. The overall result would be a general ‘retreat of the state’.5 
Now in the aftermaths of the financial meltdown, even key regulators concluded that there 
are strong ‘facts’ that “lead to the inescapable conclusion that, beyond a certain point, 
financial development is bad for an economy. Instead of supplying the oxygen that the real 
economy needs for healthy growth, it sucks the air out of the system and starts to slowly 
suffocate it.”6 Obviously the system had already passed that point before the crisis,7 when 
finance transformed from a serving role as an ‘intermediary’ to society to its master and 
‘deceiver’.8   
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Outgrow Governments, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press 1998.  
6 S. Cecchetti, ‘Is Globalisation Great?’, in Bank for International Settlements (BIS), The Future of 
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December 2012, p.4.  
7 Adair Turner, then chair of the British Financial Services Authority, concluded more carefully: 
“There is no clear evidence that the growth in the scale and complexity of the financial system in 
the rich developed world over the last twenty to thirty years has driven increased growth or 
stability, and it is possible for financial activity to contract rents from the real economy rather than 
to deliver economic value.” A. Turner, ‘What Do Banks Do? Why Do Credit Booms and Busts 
Occur? What Can Public Policy Do About It?’ in A. Turner et al. (Eds.), The Future of Finance: 
The LSE Report, London School of Economics 2010.  
8 P.H. Dembinski, Finance: Servant or Deceiver? Financialization at the Crossroads, Basingstoke 
Palgrave Macmillan 2009.  
Financialisation is a term that has been introduced to describe a ‘finance-led 
accumulation regime’,9 i.e. a system in which the growing weight of finance in relation to 
other parts of the economy such as industrial or agricultural production is transforming the 
entire society. In its broadest meaning, the term covers “the increasing role of financial 
motives, financial markets, financial players and financial institutions in the operation of the 
domestic and international economies”.10 Krippner defined “financialization as a pattern of 
accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through 
trade and commodity production”.11 The result of these ‘financial expansions’ is an 
increasing importance of speculation over productive investments also for non-financial 
firms.12 Arrighi also put financialisation in the broader context of earlier phases of financial 
expansions and reminded of the necessary terminal crisis of a dominant regime of 
accumulation. Another important aspect in financialisation literature is the clear identification 
of moderate growth and stagnation tendencies inherent to this accumulation regime.13 This 
links the debate to contemporary discussions about the limits of growth and the need for 
degrowth that have shown that growth in its current form becomes increasingly costly and 
how the ‘growth obsession’ of contemporary societies could be overcome.14 
If financialisation is understood as a particular mode of political regulation and capitalist 
accumulation, the crisis of this finance-led regime eventually opens the way for an alternative 
accumulation regime. This obviously leads to the question how recent regulatory changes 
affect financialisation in its reproduction and could help to transform the overall system into 
one that is not just more resilient but one that goes beyond financialisation. As such, a change 
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Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing  2005.  
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Verso 1994. 
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Stagnation and Upheaval from the USA to China, New York, Monthly Review Press 2012.  
14 E. Altvater, ‘The Growth Obsession’, in L. Panitch et al. (Eds.), The Globalization Decade: A 
Critical Reader, London, The Merlin Press 2004, p. 275; W. Bello, Deglobalization: Ideas for a 
New World Economy, London, Zed Books 2004; R. Heinberg, The End of Growth: Adapting to 
Our New Economic Reality, Gabriola Island, New Society Publishers  2011; S. Latouche, Farewell 
to Growth, Cambridge, Polity Press 2009. 
faces strong resistance from the currently dominant market forces, and their political 
supporters, political action, and transformative strategies are required that can become 
hegemonic. 
In the immediate aftermaths of the financial meltdown, many experts and observers 
thought that after a period of ‘neoliberalism’ with too less strict regulation and too much 
deregulation and liberalisation the ‘regulatory pendulum’ would swing back, and after being 
‘slapped by the invisible hand’15 the solution could only be a much stronger ‘visible hand’16 
of state intervention. The liberalised and deregulated markets would need to be re-embedded, 
and moreover fast action would be required as long as there is an open policy window with 
even the most powerful financial institutions and especially the hegemonic pro-market/anti-
state-intervention set of ideas weakened. However, this countermovement remained rather 
weak, and pro-market, anti-regulation advocates have started to argue with some success that 
the crisis is foremost a result of bad regulation and state failure and that more liberalisation 
and deregulation would be in order, or if there is regulation, then it should not emerge in 
populist response to public pressures but delayed until after economic recovery.17 Moreover, 
the better regulation practices assure that only measures with moderate economic costs and 
low uncertainties about their impacts are adopted. It has become a major requirement that 
proposals and decisions are based on comprehensive regulatory impact assessment, and a 
common practice is to largely ignore or underestimate the long-term costs of the current 
financial system.18 In the USA, industry frequently threatens to take legal action against 
‘overambitious’ regulators and in the EU Britain was at the forefront in establishing the pass 
of a ‘competitiveness test’ before any measures could be adopted, and in areas where the 
Commission presented more ambitious proposals industry representatives and some member 
states criticised the quality of impact assessments and threatened with legal action.19 In short, 
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2008 World Financial Crisis, Oxford,  Oxford University Press 2010. 
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International Financial Regulation,  Cheltenham, Edward Elgar  2012, p. 414. 
18 S. Johnson, ‘The Impact of Higher Capital Requirements on Banks’, New York Times Economix, 
New York, 18 April 2013. 
19 The most important example would be the proposal for enhanced cooperation in the area of 
Financial Transaction Tax. See D. Pesendorfer, ‘Financial Taxes and the Sand in the Wheels of 
fears about possible ‘overregulation’ in a situation of high economic uncertainty became 
widespread, and regulatory proposals were frequently watered down, delayed, or abandoned 
by using better regulation tools but without stopping a clear trend towards more and stricter 
regulation, raising the question about the overall direction of regulatory change. 
All in all, the regulatory response to the global financial crisis follows a typical pattern of 
adopting new regulation in response to a financial crisis, promising better disclosure, 
prudential controls, and risk management and that a similar disaster would never repeat 
despite the general trend of deregulation and liberalisation following in the typical manner at 
a later stage to re-establish some business practices again.20 Lessons from financial regulation 
also include that financial institutions are highly creative in circumventing existing and new 
regulation and regulators, lacking resources to catch up with industry developments and 
innovations, frequently loose in this ‘catch me if you can’ game. Moreover, massive business 
lobbying includes strategies to make regulations overly complex in order to create and exploit 
numerous loopholes.21 Further classical explanations for moderate reforms with regulatory 
flaws followed by weakening of regulatory standards are regulatory competition between 
jurisdictions to keep or attract capital, which led in the era of globalisation to the well-known 
debates about races to the top or bottom, and regulatory capture describing the repeated 
regulation in the interest of the regulated industry instead of the public interest. Both theories 
have been widely applied to financial regulation, especially with how they explain regulatory 
failures, flaws, and loopholes as well as unintended consequences. The literature on 
regulatory competition also shows under what conditions regulatory cooperation can be 
successful, namely, when economically important jurisdictions become drivers of change and 
use their extra-territorial policy impacts to drive change in other jurisdictions.22 Among the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Financialization: Legal Challenges for the EU Directive Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in 
the Area of Financial Transaction Tax’, European Review of Public Law, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2013, pp. 
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20 A. Persaud, ‘The Inappropriateness of Financial Regulation’, in A. Felton & C. Reinhart (Eds.), The 
First Global Financial Crisis of the 21st Century, London, CEPR 2008.  
21 L. Zingales, A Capitalism for the People: Recapturing the Lost Genius of American Prosperity, , 
New York, Basic Books 2012, p. 203. 
22 D. Vogel & J.F.M. Swinnen (Eds.), Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: The Shifting Roles of 
the EU, the US and California, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 2011.  
broad literature on regulatory capture, especially the most recent one is significant with the 
focus on how particular institutional designs can help to avoid or minimise capture.23 
C. Financialisation, Regulatory Reforms, and the Future of Finance in the 
European Union 
Within the EU, official debates shifted dramatically over recent years from early deceptive 
claims that the crisis would be one of Anglo-American capitalism with little effects on 
(continental) Europe to embarrassment that experts and stress tests did not foresee the 
bailouts and that member states in fiscal distress could not be rescued without support by the 
International Monetary Fund and realisation that the EU or at least the Eurozone countries 
were suddenly centre stage of global concern about instability, with the very survival of the 
EU and its currency union becoming topics of controversies and political struggles. In the 
years before the crisis, the internal market project had some particular features reflecting the 
high degree of fragmentation and diversity in the Union’s financial sector that was still an 
incomplete single market. It was not just the British ‘Big Bang’ financial revolution of 1986 
and a decade later the light-touch regulatory approach introduced by New Labour for the City 
of London as one of the world’s financial centres back then in deregulatory competition with 
Wall Street that had transformed the role of Europe’s finance significantly. Other member 
states’ financial sectors too underwent substantial transformations outside regulatory 
frameworks or were supported by regulatory change and contributed to the emergence of 
financialisation.  Ireland, France, and the Netherlands, for example, became important 
locations for shadow banking; Italian, Swedish, and especially Austrian banks gained a 
dominant role in Eastern European countries, where also French and Belgium banks were 
considerably engaged, while Cyprus attracted significant capital from Russia and Greek 
banks that had only started to engage more in neighbouring countries. Several countries 
including Luxemburg, the UK, and Austria have as ‘tax havens’ offered incentives for 
investors. Across all member states’ banks, off-balance sheet and shadow banking activities 
became highly important, increasing speculation and driving the boom in securitisation. 
Significantly, capital markets and financial integration policies drove Europe into a direction 
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that made finance extracting value continuously from the ‘real economy’ and increasing the 
sector’s overall power. Finance was a key area identified within policies aiming at finishing 
the internal market and improving the EU’s competitiveness based on economic theory that 
highlighted the advantages of international capital mobility and high liquidity (nowadays 
interpreted as excessive liquidity) that would work in the advantage of European 
convergence. 
Deregulation has been widely understood as the triumph of markets over governments, 
and European integration was frequently presented as an attempt to regain political power 
based on a significantly large internal market and a strong European currency that should 
reduce globalisation pressures internally and provide the Union externally a strong position to 
drive regulatory harmonisation where this was thought necessary. When the first 10 years of 
the euro were celebrated, there was wide agreement among experts and the political elite that 
the currency union had been a success in terms of generating economic stability and 
increased cross-border activities, that it had successfully survived a number of tests, 
especially during the South-East Asian financial crisis, and that the euro proved to be a hard 
currency. Financial integration was also seen as necessary to direct capital from the slower 
growing richer countries to the less developed fast growers, resulting in convergence. 
However, the various policies of the EU to generate deep and highly liquid capital markets, to 
support cross-border activities, mergers, and acquisitions, and the emergence of large 
European financial conglomerates that would become major global players were the regional 
version of a finance-led accumulation regime that has become highly instable and 
unsustainable. Especially the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB), and 
transnational financial corporations were described as strong promoters of a “transition 
toward the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism” and pushed for deepening “the overall 
financialization of the European economy” with the Economic and Monetary Union, the 
Financial Services Action Plan, and the Basel II Accord. The Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive liberalised the trading environment to which markets responded with 
increasing algorithmic trading, including high-frequency trading. However, the overall effects 
of financialisation have been modified by what Ryner called ‘compensatory neoliberalism’24 
resulting from the high degree of diversity and fragmentation with many small and medium-
sized enterprises and small-scale and public banks. Critics expected that with the overall 
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Model, London, Routledge 2002.  
direction in European financial integration, the continental models of capitalism would get 
successively weakened.25 
Among the many reforms that came on the agenda since the crisis, this section takes a 
closer look at key areas affecting the future of financialisation by addressing extreme 
leverage, overly complex and problematic structures, and highly speculative activities: capital 
requirements, structures of banks, orderly resolution, and shadow banking (alternative 
investment funds and derivatives). 
I. Stricter Capital Requirements 
Among the many reforms of recent years, the main approach to deal with extreme and short-
term leverage is the reform of the Basel Accord aiming at reducing systemic risk by 
deleveraging financial institutions via requiring higher capital buffers, limiting off-balance 
sheet activities, generally requiring more risk-sensitive capital adequacy ratios, and providing 
more transparency to stakeholders about banks’ risk profiles. Stricter requirements with 
regard to the quantity and quality of bank capital, to be implemented gradually until 2019, lie 
at the heart of the Basel III reforms, which also include the idea of countercyclical capital 
buffers and of additional loss-absorbency requirements for the largest banks. The G20 
member states’ leaders committed to a timely, full, and consistent implementation of Basel 
III to avoid regulatory competition, and the Basel Committee adopted a Regulatory 
Consistency Assessment Programme to monitor implementation and enforcement. Compared 
to the USA where reforms were delayed and only after JPMorgan’s ‘London Whale loss’ 
reform pressure increased to implement Basel III fully, the EU implemented the Basel 
reforms a bit faster via the Capital Requirements Directive amendments (CRD II-IV and) and 
the adoption of a Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR). The stricter capital requirements 
are generally seen as necessary requirement for financial stability, although not as a sufficient 
condition. Most actors see them as a step in the right direction if consistently implemented, 
with some arguing that the capital requirements are still not strict enough, while others regard 
them as unnecessarily strict. From the point of view that leverage has become too extreme 
and deleveraging is necessary, stricter capital requirements are not only an absolutely 
necessary measure but also one that would allow adjustments towards further deleveraging in 
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Regulation’ in B. Van Apeldoorn, J. Drahokoupil & L. Horn (Eds.), Contradictions and Limits of 
Neoliberal European Governance: From Lisbon to Lisbon, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan 2009, 
p. 88.  
a post-recovery environment. However, this would require deleveraging to become a stronger 
goal within transformative strategies and continuous pressure from supportive actors that can 
resist industry pressures to return to higher leverage which can certainly be expected again. 
Currently, Basel III and CRD IV/CRR foresee that a stricter implementation of the leverage 
ratio needs further research and an ‘extended observation period’, with a report to be 
prepared by the end of 2015 and introducing the leverage ratio as a binding measure as of 
2018. 
II. Reforming the Structures of Banks via Direct Regulation 
Some of the most controversial questions are about the optimum size and number of banks, 
what roles banks with deposit insurance should fulfil, how size and activities affect 
interconnectedness of financial institutions, and how overall interconnectedness could be 
decreased to improve the system’s resilience. Structures of financial institutions are generally 
influenced by a number of factors including various economic and market conditions such as 
the level of competition (domestically and international) and the firms’ funding (short-
term/long-term) as well as by the regulatory environment (competition laws and policies, 
market abuse rules, direct and indirect regulation affecting the structure of financial 
institutions). 
With regard to direct regulation, a variety of reform proposals have emerged with a 
general agreement on more competitive and more transparent structures while not necessary 
with regard to the optimum level of complexity. Especially in the USA, demands for breaking 
up megabanks and to split commercial from investment banking were brought forward by a 
number of actors from the left and right wing of the political spectrum, while in Europe the 
largest banks successfully defended their claim that they were less affected by the crisis, that 
the European model of ‘universal banks’ would be superior, and that not size but only the 
quality of an institution’s risk management quality would allow conclusions about impacts on 
financial stability. As a result, both jurisdictions went into different directions: while the USA 
incorporated the Volcker Rule26 into Dodd-Frank, the EU has so far not adopted any 
                                                
26 The Volcker Rule, named after the former Federal Reserve chair Paul A. Volcker, or ‘proprietary 
trading provision’ in the Dodd-Frank Act, s. 619, prohibits banks from owning, investing in, or 
sponsoring hedge funds or private equity funds and from engaging in proprietary trading. The rule 
became more and more complex in the implementation negotiations between agencies and 
industry. 
measures, and only proposals for ring-fencing27 exist,28 but the UK29 and Germany30 will 
implement ring-fencing in some variation. However, more importantly at both sides of the 
Atlantic, more radical proposals were opposed by the key actors, and all jurisdictions have 
brought forward complex reform proposals with significant flaws and loopholes.31 
III. Resolution 
Ending bailouts requires not only more resilient banking structures but also that an orderly 
resolution regime is in place that enhances financial stability by allowing banks to fail 
without infecting important parts of the system. Such a regime should also reduce moral 
hazard and protect depositors. The G20 Pittsburgh Summit called for “addressing cross-
border resolutions and systemically important financial institutions by end-2010”,32 and the 
G20 Financial Stability Board was given the task to develop “Key Attributes of Effective 
Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions”. 
In terms of adopting a resolution regime that allows ending TBTF, the EU is lacking 
behind the USA. Dodd-Frank requires the banks to produce ‘living wills’, which are divided 
into two parts, one public and one confidential for agency-eyes only. The experience with 
these resolution plans so far has been rather disappointing with regard to both parts. But there 
is generally scope for gradual institutional change leading to stricter implementation as well 
as scope for regulatory capture and continued weak implementation. 
The UK also adopted measures with the Banking Act 2009 that introduced a special 
resolution regime (SRR) for banks. Further changes will come with the EU Recovery and 
Resolution Directive and reform proposals made by the UK Independent Commission on 
                                                
27 Compared to the USA, the EU member states have no history of a separation between retail and 
investment banking. The universal banking model led to the ring-fencing proposals that require a 
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28 E. Liikanen et al., High-level Expert Group on Reforming the Structure of the EU Banking Sector: 
Final Report, Brussels, 2 October 2012.  
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Expert Group, and the changes have to be implemented by mid-2015. 
31 For a more detailed discussion including various alternative proposals, see D. Pesendorfer. ‘Beyond 
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Banking and HM Treasury33 to extend resolution to non-bank financial institutions. With 
regard to globally active SIFIs, the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the 
Bank of England worked together to develop resolution strategies.34 
The European Commission released its proposal for a Directive establishing a framework 
for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (BRRD) in June 
2012,35 requiring that member states “ensure that each institution draws up and maintains a 
recovery plan” that should be updated at least “annually or after change to the legal or 
organisational structure of the institution, its business or its financial situation”. Competent 
authorities could also demand more frequent updates. The most important aspect of 
resolution is the so-called bail-in clause that sets out a hierarchy for financial contributions in 
case of solvency.36 However, there is a limit for bail-ins beyond which the taxpayer would 
still have to contribute to bailouts. 
Additional measures became part of the emerging banking union. The Commission 
proposed a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for banks led by the ECB in September 
2012. In June 2013, the Commission published its proposals for a regulation establishing a 
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and a Single Bank Resolution Fund.37 
The plans for the banking union foresee the regulatory oversight of the 130 largest banks 
by the ECB. The design and operating mechanisms for the resolution authority are still 
unclear. However, creating a centralised bank resolution authority is controversial. Member 
states argue that emergency action needs to happen within hours, and that could not be 
achieved within a complex network of 18 finance ministers, 18 finance departments, and 18 
national resolution authorities. Another issue is whether there should be a Eurozone-wide 
resolution fund or national resolution funds. Germany has strongly argued for national funds 
to avoid domestically the political debate about German banks paying for the rescue of other 
banks; especially regional banks have largely opposed that idea. Others have argued that it 
would not make any sense to use a good number of national funds to rescue a large bank that 
would usually be active in a greater number of countries. 
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Another key aspect with regard to the emerging regime is the requirement of sufficient 
funds, to be provided by the industry itself. Such a recovery fund still needs to be established 
over the coming years, funded by a tax that has frequently been used as an argument against 
introducing a financial transaction tax that would have a stronger impact on speculative 
activities. 
IV. Regulating Alternative Investment Funds 
With the global financial crisis, it became clear that an increasing number of financial 
institutions have emerged that were largely unregulated and outside of regulatory oversight 
but can pose a threat to financial stability. The term introduced for such institutions is shadow 
banks. It includes conduits, structured investment vehicles, hedge funds, private equity, and 
money market funds. They are characterised by short-term borrowing in rollover debt 
markets, significant leverage, and investment in longer-term and illiquid assets. Shadow 
banking raises systemic concerns because of its size and its high level of interconnectedness 
to the regulated financial system. It is estimated that in terms of aggregated assets shadow 
banking has become “half the size of the regulated banking system” with a geographical 
concentration in the USA and the EU/UK.38 
While the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted in 2010 a regulation 
of money market funds, they only came recently on the EU’s agenda beyond their limited 
coverage by existing legislation, when the Commission released a Green Paper.39 With regard 
to other important areas, both jurisdictions adopted new regulations. The focus here was on 
managers of ‘alternative investment funds’ instead of regulating the institutions themselves.40 
The EU adopted the Alternative Investment Funds Managers Directive (AIFMD).41 
Additionally, the Commission adopted a Delegated Regulation regulating exemptions, 
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operating conditions, depositaries, leverage, transparency, and supervision.42 Member states 
had to transpose the Directive into national law by July 2013. The technical implementation 
standards were left to the Commission and finalised without any need for transposition.43 
Further technical guidelines were published by the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA).44 
The regulatory approaches taken do not put into question the enormous growth of 
shadow banks over recent years and suggest those institutions are all necessary for the future. 
In its 2013 Communication on Shadow Banking, the Commission emphasises “the important 
role that it plays within the financial sector” as “an alternative financing channel that is 
essential to the real economy, particularly at a time when traditional actors in the banking 
system are reducing financial support”.45 Hedge funds, for example, have grown worldwide 
“from around 3,800 in early 2000 to over 10,000 in late 2007”, around 2000 did not survive 
the crisis,46 and many suffered significant losses but others profited from the crisis. In the 
meantime, the overall number is going up again. With the crisis, also the capital invested in 
the global hedge fund industry went down but is back to strong growth again.47 During the 
crisis, hedge funds have been widely criticised for a long-term performance problem and that 
they would make their clients48 less money than mainstream financial markets while fees are 
extremely high. Nevertheless, especially pension funds continue to invest in them “as a safer, 
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low-volatility option in a tough investment landscape”. As a result, hedge funds “have more 
cash to manage than ever”.49 
Before the crisis, hedge funds got in some countries, especially in Germany and France, 
under heavy critique for their speculative activities. However, demands for strict regulation or 
even a ban, frequently raised in the critical globalisation ‘another world is possible’ 
movement, were not supported, and hedge funds were only moderately regulated, in the UK, 
for example, via their managers,50 and with regard to their marketing. Now, Dodd-Frank as 
well as AIMFD extended the approach of regulating managers/advisors quite significantly. 
However, the thresholds for regulation are too high, offshore funds insufficiently regulated, 
and the approach of only regulating managers is problematic for hedge funds that already 
proved in the past to be highly flexible. However, industry had support strong enough to 
water down the original proposal further via impact assessments and lobbying. In the USA, 
regulators, which were criticised even from inside for lacking resources for effective 
implementation and enforcement, compensated the industry with lifting the ban on marketing 
funds to the public.51 Having lost the battle to give up their secrecy, hedge funds opposed 
further regulations that would have affected them negatively. Their associations have 
continued to emphasise the need for high liquidity and have for that purpose defended 
(naked) short-selling and high-frequency trading,52 two areas heavily criticised as harmful 
speculative activities with unfair competitive elements. With regard to the AIFMD, they 
remained highly concerned about various aspects such as lock-in/lock-out effects and lobbied 
massively for watering down draft regulations to take into account the existing ‘diversity of 
funds’ which invest in all kinds of asset classes and with all kinds of investment strategies. 
In short, the regulatory approach in the area of shadow banks remains within 
financialisation by only aiming at improving the market by increasing transparency and 
capital requirements, improving liquidity management, requiring information for investors 
and regulators, etc. in the least burdensome way for the sector and without questioning the 
size and growth of the industry as such. Although ‘extreme’ leverage can become subject to 
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imposing limits, intervention will largely depend on the regulators’ strictness. However, 
debates are still going on at the global level and in the EU.53 Recently, the Bank of England 
raised concerns about systemic risk from hedge funds and concluded that it needed to collect 
more information.54 Regulators still have a focus on developments in the sector, and reforms 
might be extended gradually. However, a change from managers to funds and a linkage to 
downsizing strategies would require a broader debate about the role of shadow banking 
within and beyond financialisation that currently does not seem to be part of the expert 
discourse among regulators. 
V. Derivatives, the New Risk Management, and the Need to Regulate Products 
Derivatives, such as futures, forwards, options, and swaps, are financial products whose 
values are derived from an ‘underlying’ value, be it an asset such as residential mortgages, 
commodities for credit derivatives, index, and weather conditions for agricultural products to 
name just a few. A typical definition is that they are “financial contracts that are designed to 
create market price exposure to changes in an underlying commodity, asset or event”.55 
Derivatives fulfil three functions: hedge, arbitrage, and speculation. They have been traded 
on specialised derivatives exchanges or over-the-counter (OTC), usually by a few dealers. 
The growth in derivatives has by far outstripped the growth in the underlying commodity 
production and the need for derivatives to hedge risk. Especially OTC derivatives expanded 
rapidly since the 1980s. While regulators such as the BIS or the US Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) got increasingly concerned about the threat to financial 
stability from this growth and the diversity in products, attempts to regulate them beyond 
voluntary industry self-regulation failed, and regulatory change was moreover designed to 
increase the attractiveness of these products.56 As a result, OTC derivatives became important 
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elements of the shadow banking system. The OTC derivatives market is also characterised by 
the central role played by a very small number of globally active large financial institutions, 
which therefore pose a high potential for contagion. As the crisis and numerous examples 
before have shown, these mega-institutions have also the possibility to abuse their market 
position by using the lack of transparency to pass on toxic assets to other institutions.57 Only 
recently, this led at least in the USA to settlements between banks and regulators, including a 
US$13 billion settlement with JPMorgan which is the largest settlement ever between 
government officials and a singly company. But in Europe too the largest banks set aside 60 
billion euros for legal disputes, settlements, and fines.58 
With regard to OTC derivatives, the regulatory approach supported by the G20 was the 
introduction of clearing through central counterparties (CCPs) and trade repositories for this 
market to increase transparency, to reduce counterparty risk, and to assure sufficient 
collateral for trades. The G20 Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009 set the goal and a time 
frame for reforms: 
All standardised OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or 
electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central 
counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be 
reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be 
subject to higher capital requirements.59 
The idea of central clearing was already discussed before the crisis as it was well established 
in other areas. However, initiatives including incentives to extend the approach to derivatives 
voluntarily had failed. Now it seemed an adequate approach to shift away the attention from 
ideas to adopt strict product regulation for derivatives and to significantly downsize this 
US$700 trillion market or even more radically to completely ban OTC products and to allow 
only derivatives traded on regulated exchanges. Despite the lessons from the crisis, there was, 
as Morgan emphasised, still a powerful coalition of “financial institutions, the interdealer 
brokers, and some of the clients, together with the support of many economists and 
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commentators for the idea that the OTC market was efficient”60 who successfully blocked 
any radical change. 
The EU implemented the G20 commitment with the European Market Infrastructure 
Regulation61 (EMIR), adopted on 4 July 2012 and entering into force on 16 August 2012. 
EMIR introduced mandatory clearing for all standardised OTC derivative contracts by the 
end of 2012 and a reporting obligation to trade repositories. The European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) became responsible for drafting the regulatory and implementing 
technical standards and has now a central role in the authorisation and monitoring of CCPs 
and trade repositories. The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is responsible for the 
oversight of CCPs. With regard to the adaptation of technical standards and guidelines, 
‘market participants’ have to be consulted, and regulatory impact assessments are required. 
The overall implementation design, regulatory competition, and regulatory capture make it 
likely that the regulation becomes weaker. 
But there are also possibilities for gradual institutional change that could result in stricter 
regulation. The G20 mandate provides powers to the Financial Stability Board and national 
regulators to take further measures if those taken would be “insufficient to improve 
transparency in the derivatives markets, mitigate systemic risk, and protect against market 
abuse.” EMIR gives the Commission the task “to monitor closely the evolution of the OTC 
derivatives market” and to intervene “where necessary”, especially with regard to any 
“unintended competitive distortions of the OTC derivatives market” and “to prevent 
competitive distortions from occurring in the internal market with the aim of ensuring a level 
playing field in the financial markets.”62 Additionally, some further aspects of the G20 
commitments still need to be implemented via reform of the current Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID)63 and the Market Abuse Directive.64 
The introduction of CCPs to reduce counterparty risk is a fundamental change, given that 
up to now only a small percentage of OTC contracts are centrally cleared. Under EMIR, 
CCPs need to have all sorts of risk management in place, to establish a default fund, and to be 
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able withstand the simultaneous default of the two largest clearing members. However, there 
are a number of problems with central clearing and trade repositories. Some authors have 
argued that the number of CCPs would need to remain small and clearing “sufficiently 
centralized”65 for a functioning or even optimum system, but there are also risks with CCPs 
becoming too big or too interconnected and a general risk that the taxpayer ends up bailing 
out CCPs, if they take on too many risks and if their default fund would be insufficient. 
Given competition between CCPs for market shares, a race to the bottom between them could 
occur, especially when a new wave of deregulation and liberalisation would set in or when 
regulators become less concerned or captured. It is important to note that in the USA with 
Republicans trying to undermine Dodd-Frank, the regulator lacks resources for effective 
implementation.66 Given global competition, this could easily lead to a similar approach in 
Europe (and Japan where CCPs have also been introduced). Another issue is that in order to 
address the counterparty credit risk, the new institutional and risk-management practices 
depend increasingly on ‘time-critical liquidity’, which has significant consequences on 
financial stability, given all kinds of interdependencies and interconnectivity in the emerging 
new system.67 Moreover, it remains to be seen how many contracts will become standardised 
and centrally cleared and how many will remain uncleared transactions and whether the risk 
mitigation techniques for them will be sufficient. 
The most significant problem with OTC derivatives remains that the market as such 
should not be radically downsized and that the overall regulatory framework has been 
designed in a way to assure that costs would not increase too much and are outweighed by 
higher legal certainty of contracts while liquidity and flexibility for market participants stay 
high. The OTC derivatives markets only shrunk for a short period during the crisis in 2009 
and 2010 and have returned to growth since then. The new system will bring more 
transparency into at least parts of the market and maybe lead to more stability via the higher 
capital and collateral requirements. In Europe, the possible introduction of a financial 
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transaction tax might have an additional effect on the size of the market.68 However, from the 
experience with OTC derivatives so far a stricter product regulation seems necessary to 
downsize the market and to keep new innovation under control. 
Bringing new financial products on the market has in most jurisdictions become highly 
unregulated in the era of deregulated and liberalised financial markets. Countries that kept 
stricter product regulation in place were frequently criticised for losing out in competitiveness 
and wealth generation. However, the crisis showed clearly that countries with stricter product 
regulation such as Canada or India were less affected. This led to various calls for a stricter 
product regulation that also emphasised comparisons to food, drugs, or the European 
chemicals regulation69 but which have not found their way into EMIR or Dodd-Frank. 
Products could be regulated in two ways: either their marketisation could be subject to 
approval by a regulator or only products that were explicitly allowed for in law could enter 
the market. While the first approach would be faster, there might be a higher risk that 
regulatory capture comes into play. Especially the second approach is seen as a major barrier 
to financial innovation that has led to many claims that any such product regulation would 
stop innovation without any further consideration of what kind of innovations would be 
stopped and what kind of innovations would still go ahead. Morgan identifies “a variety of 
disadvantages to the originators of such products” such as that “nobody would be able to 
accrue first-mover advantage and the possibility of rapidly establishing scale and reputation 
for these new products would be more difficult to achieve.”70 Epstein and Crotty argue for 
strict regulation of innovations “both before and after they get into circulation” as part of a 
‘Financial Precautionary Principle’ and with a ‘Financial Stability and Product Safety 
Administration’ as regulator “that will test and approve (or deny) the marketing of new 
financial products”.71 With regard to OTC derivatives, Epstein and Crotty formulated 
important ideas such as ‘sunset provisions’ for the approval of all highly complex financial 
products and a clear rule:  
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if the product is too complex to understand with a relatively high degree of 
certainty as to how it will function in normal times and especially in times of 
stress, then it should NOT be approved until it is well understood. In less 
extreme cases where the likely benefits are high, it should only be approved 
with very strict limitations and follow-up requirements, including possible 
high liquidity and/or capital reserve requirements. In other words, the rule 
should be that if the tests are insufficiently clear and the assumptions 
insufficiently sensible, and the results murky or negative, then the product 
should not be approved, unless it can be proven by the sponsor that the social 
benefits far outweigh the risks.72 
‘Shifting the burden of proof’ is a key aspect of precautionary public policy. 
For overcoming a major problem of financialisation, strict product regulation would be 
unavoidable. As a result, financial innovation would be significantly transformed, not by 
ending innovation as opponents have claimed, but by increasing the chances to stop toxic 
innovations before they can reach a level where they become too risky. Transformative 
strategies would need to extend the proposals for strict product regulation with ideas to make 
the regulator capture-proof. 
D. The Regulatory Space for Transformative Strategies 
With regard to reform outputs and outcomes, some scholars have argued that only the next 
crisis might show whether the reforms were sufficient or did not go far enough.73 
Nevertheless, evaluations of reforms have already shown quite significant shortcomings, 
flaws, and loopholes and identified possible (unintended) consequences. As the major 
decisions about the reform direction have already been taken, a lot depends on 
implementation and, further, now more gradual change resulting from the new regulatory 
environment. It has also been argued that problems will always occur in unexpected new 
areas74 and this is certainly right for overly complex systems. In chemicals regulation, this 
insight has led to demands for dematerialisation, stricter product regulation, and a strict 
implementation of the precautionary principle. In financial regulation, calls for significant 
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deleveraging and downsizing finance as well as for a financial precautionary principle are 
comparatively new especially with regard to their impacts on transforming financialisation. 
Indeed, the questions about optimum capital requirements and leverage, optimum banking 
structures, and optimum sizes of particular markets are difficult to answer. As the discussion 
of key European reform areas has shown, financial reform has not met the expectations of 
those that hoped to transform the finance-led accumulation regime, and there are still strong 
beliefs that megabanks, large financial conglomerates, rapidly growing alternative investment 
funds, and derivatives markets are positive and can be controlled. If we accept that such a 
system is extracting resources from the real economy and that the growth in finance has clear 
limits beyond which its contribution to wealth becomes negative, further and more ambitious 
reforms become unavoidable, also requiring new transformative strategies. 
In most areas discussed above, regulators and the Commission were given powers to 
closely observe developments and take further actions if necessary. Given the history of 
regulators as business-friendly and dependent on information provided by business, there are 
various strategies necessary to assure gradual institutional change for a more sustainable 
system. Firstly, a more strategic use of different business interests would be necessary. In 
major reform areas, different business interests have more been used for moderate 
reformulations within financialisation than for transforming the finance-led accumulation 
regime. In the derivatives reform, for example, exchanges became powerful actors in pushing 
for market shares as future clearing houses, without any interest in significantly downsizing 
this huge market. 
Lawmakers and regulators are still captured. Making legislators and regulators capture-
proof is a key lesson from the capture literature. An important strategy is “strengthening the 
plurality of voices and perspectives in the regulatory process […] to reduce the risks that 
regulators find themselves exposed to one-sided evidence from the regulated financial 
sector.”75 Not surprisingly given the costs of regulatory change, concerns caused massive 
lobbying activities, in June 2010 even culminating in protests by members of the European 
Parliament (including conservatives, liberals, social democrats, greens, and united left MEPs) 
that they reached an unacceptable and unprecedented level that would endanger democracy.76 
To counterbalance this influence and following a call from EU officials and politicians, a new 
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NGO – Finance Watch – was founded with financial support by the EU in 2011 to observe 
the regulatory debates and to intervene in law-making processes. This approach is not new 
and has been used in other areas such as environmental regulation, where NGOs frequently 
receive funding to contribute to reform debates. However, this practice has also been 
criticised for undermining the independence of NGOs. In the context of the newer regulatory 
capture literature, there would be many more ideas how to design institutions in a way to 
allow continued influences from outside the mainstream in regulatory oversight and 
throughout the policy cycle via requirements for using diverse and independent expertise or 
assuring adequate media coverage. This debate is well established in the USA but so far only 
insufficiently part of the regulatory practice and largely absent in the European discourse. 
Existing examples also show that more public pressure and action as well as leadership by 
key actors are important requirements for success. 
Yet, austerity and crisis management have had limiting impacts on any attempts to assure 
high pressure during implementation and enforcement of already adopted measures. The 
regulatory space for transformative strategies and taming finance in times of crisis and 
austerity seems rather limited, but with increased public protest potential, the continued 
possibility of aftershocks, and further crises, actors interested in overcoming financialisation 
need to find new and broader coalitions and develop strategies using the insights from 
literature on regulatory capture, regulatory competition, financialisation, and limits to growth. 
